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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
1 
As was stated by appellant, this is an action broug]i( 
under the provisions of §14-2-2 Utah Code Annotated 
1953 against home owners because of their failure to 
obtain a bond from their contractor. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court ruled against plaintiff on all of 
its causes of action on the ground that the actions were 
barred by the statute of limitations, and on the additional 
ground that plaintiff was not a materialman under tht' 
contract as contemplated by Title 14, Chapter 2 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek that the decree of the trial court 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as appellant has not made a complete 
statement of the facts, respondents desire to re-state all 
of the material facts. 
This suit involves separate causes of action against 
25 individual home owners, each of whom, together with 
their wives, are defendants and respondents in this ae-
tion. Plaintiff's action against each home owner iR 
based upon §14-2-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953 which 
imposes liability upon any owner of land who enters 
into a construction contract in excess of $500.00, allll 
who fails to require his contractor to obtain a bond for 
the protection of laborers and materialmen. 
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"F~a<'h of the defendants in this action entered into 
:111 i rnli vidual construction contract for the construction 
Iii n homl' with Olympic Construction Company, Inc. as 
µ;C'ncrnl contractor. Olympic contracted with Stanley 
D. Hohinson, d/b/a Reliable Roofing Company, for the 
rnofillg sub-contract on each home. Each owner paid 
thC' gcHcral contractor in full, and the general contrac-
1 or in turn paid the sub-contractor in full on each job. 
Plaintiff and appellant, Cro-wn Roofing and Engineer-
inQ" Company, d/b/a Roofer's Supply Company, (re-
fl>ned to in this Brief as Roofer's Supply Company) 
claims to he a supplier of roofing materials to the sub-
<·011tractor, and claims to have furnished materials to 
the homes of these respondents for which it never re-
cein'u payment. It is admitted that none of the owners 
requir0<l their general contractor to furnish a bond. 
During the trial, the causes of action against de-
fondants Brown, Beckstead, Newbold, Paulsen, United 
Hom0R, Inc., Wickham, Larson and Marsen were dis-
missC>1l, 0ither because of proof of payment to plaintiff, 
or for bck of jurisdiction (R-114, 144, 192). There is 
no issnc on appeal regarding these defendants. 
With the exception of defendants Nelson, Amann, 
DC"an nn<l Cripe, the roofs on the homes of respondents 
\\l'l'(' co11structed of materials consisting of gravel, felt 
a]I([ tar, and were referred to throughout the trial as 
"built np" roofs. ·with respect to the gravel roof jobs, 
l lir e\·icl<'HCC sho\Yecl that appellant could not tell where 
lliP rn:tl< 1 rials were suppliecl from, other than it \ms 
1 lH· (lpi nion of the prcsirlent of Roofer's Supply Com-
3 
pany that the materials had been purchased from 
Roofer's Supply Company (R-188). The roofing snh-
contractor testified that all materials used for the grm'el 
roofs were purchased in carload quantities and deliverer! 
to his, the sub-contractor's, warehouse (R-201); thnt 
his roofing crew loaded at the warehouse and took 
materials to individual jobs (R-202); that approximately 
5% of his total business was contracted through Olvm-
pic Construction Company, and the balance was <lone 
for other general contractors (R-200); that he pur-
chased roofing materials from other suppliers other 
than Roofer's Supply Company (R-202); and that he 
had no way of telling where the materials on any par-
ticular job came from (R-202). 
The homes of defendants Nelson, Amann, Bean and 
Cripe were shingle type roofs. It appeared from the 
evidence that the sub-contractor purchased all of his 
shingles from Roofer's Supply Company (R-202). The 
president of Roofer's Supply Company also testifirrl 
that he visited the four shingle jobs and could tell from 
the color of the shingles that they came from his com-
pany; however, he had no personal knowledge of their 
delivery (R-189), nor could he tell what materials were 
underneath the shingles (R-188). 
The evidence further showed that all of the labor 
and material for the roofs in question, with the excep-
tion of the job for defendant Youngbergs, were supplied 
more than one year from the date of the filing of thi~ 
action ( R-216). 
4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED 
THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS. 
Prior to May 1, 1965, the law in Utah was in a state 
of uucertainty as to whether the three year statute of 
limitations at §76-12-26 Utah Code Annotated 1953 re-
ln.ting to obligations other than penalties created by 
statute, or the one year statute of limitations at §78-12-29 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 relating to an action upon 
a statute for a penalty where the action is given to an 
individual applied to actions under the bonding law. 
The 1965 Legislature law fit to clarify this confusion 
an<l passed an amendment to the bonding law at §14-2-2 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, wherein the 
uncertainty once and for all was laid to rest, and a one 
year statute of limitations was specifically made ap-
plicable. 
The plaintiff in the instant case filed its action 
after the effective date of the 1965 amendment, but the 
alleged causes of action arose prior to the passage of 
the amendment. Thus the legal issues to be determined 
are (1) whether the 1965 limitations amendment is to 
he appliPd in retrospect to this action, and, if not (2) 
whether prior to the passage of said amendment the 
0J1r year or the three year statute of limitations was 
applirahle to actions under the bonding statute. The 
tri;tl comt applied the earlier one year statute of limi-
tatio11s (R-223) although the section number of the 
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statute is erroneously misquoted m the Fiwli11gs nl' 
Fact (R-105). 
The 1965 amendment to the bonding law at ~14-~-2 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended, did not by its t<'nns 
state whether it was to have a prospective or retrospPc-
tive operation, but simply provided as follows: 
''Actions to recover on such liabilitv shall he 
commenced within one year from th~ last datP 
the last materials were furnished or the labor 
performed.'' 
The courts generally are not in agreement as to the 
application of a statute of limitations to existing cansps 
of action, however, with respect to statutes not expressly 
ref erring to said existing causes of action, the law is 
summarized at 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Action ~ 4(c) 
as follows: 
"When the statute declares generally that no 
action, or no action of a certain class, shall he 
brought, except within a certain limited timP 
after it shall have accrued, the language of the 
statute would naturally make it apply to past 
actions as well as to those arising in the futnre, 
and the fact that the statute makes no exception 
of existing causes of action raises a strong pre-
sumption that it intended to make none, although 
this conclusion has also been emphaticall:' dc-
niecl.'' 
The above general rule, of course, woulcl he crnhj0rt to 
the constitutional requirement that a reasonahl0 time 
be afforded a litigant to commence proceedings oll an 
existing cause of action before the lrnr takes 0ffrrt. :J:1 
C .. T.S. Limitations of Action, ,::z. Th0 amendment to 
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l+-~-2 Utah Cocle Annotated 1953, as amended, was 
mnd(' dfcrtiYL' J\fay 11, 1965 (Laws of Utah 1965, Chap-
!l'r :!+). ~While the session laws do not show the actual 
date that the amendment was passed, it can be assumed 
t!11li thl' passage took place prior to the adjournment 
of tlie session which was March 10, 1965 (See Laws of 
Utilh 1963, Authentication Page of Secretary of State). 
Tlins any party with a cause of action barred by the 
.sintnie hacl a period in excess of hvo months in which to 
filr- a11 action. Respondents contend that this is not an 
u11rPaso11able time period in which to require plaintiff 
to hring an action, particularly in light of cases holding 
that 30-dny limitation periods meet the test of due process 
nncl have been upheld. Oberst vs. Mays 148 Colo. 285, 
:JG:> P. 2d 902. 
B~ven assuming, however, that the 1965 amendment 
i" not applicable to this case, Respondents contend that 
ilte one year statute of limitations at §78-12-29 Utah Code 
A imotated 1953 would be controlling. This section covers 
"a11 action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture 
where the action is given to an individual." The appli-
ration of this statute depends on whether the liability 
imposed upon a home mvner to pay for his home twice 
l1P('anse he fails to comply with the statute, is a penalty. 
:'\ t Volume 31A, Words and Phrases, beginning at 
P<lg-r· 414, Reveral hundred cases are cited construing the 
\\Onl "penalty." There are all kinds of definitions and 
('\]1lam1ti01rn of this term - some narrow and some 
hru;1d. As stated therein, the words "penal" and "pen-
:111~"" han• many different shades of meanill'g and are 
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among the most elastic terms known to law. One of thP 
common definitions of the term penalty is a punishment 
imposed for violation of rule or law. Wilemon vs. Brow 11 
51 F.Supp. 978; Larngdon vs. New York L.E. and W.R. 
Compamy 9 N.Y.S. 245. It is said to be a sum of money 
which the law exacts by way of punishment for doing 
something that is prohibited, or omitting to do something 
that is required to be done. In Re Denver if R.G. W.R. 
Comparny 27 F.Supp. 983. 
The above definition would seem to clearly apply to 
the instant case. Here the bonding statute at ~14-2-1 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 imposes a mandatory require-
ment in that every O\vner before entering into a co11-
struction con tract "shall" obtain a bond from his con-
tractor. The following section then imposes the pen-
alty for failure to do that which is required by law, thr 
penalty being personal liability to all persons who haw 
furnished materials or performed labor under the con-
tract. Thus when the bonding statute is invoked, the 
owner is required to pay twice. 
There are additional reasons why the word "pen-
alty" as it may apply to bonding law cases should he 
construed in its broadest possible sense, and why the 
one year rather than the three year statute of limita-
tions should apply. Actions of this type have generally 
and traditionally been characterized by short statutes 
of limitation. Section 14-1-3 Utah Code Annotated 19:i~ 
dealing with failure to require bonds for public contrndc 
provides for a one year statute of limitations. Certain!) 
there could be no legislative justification for a one year 
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;:hdnte of limitations in connection with bonds on public 
co11tnictR, and a three year statute of limitations in con-
J1ectio11 with bonds on private contracts. 
Also this court has held on several occasions that 
because of their common purposes, the provisions of the 
bonding statute are to be construed in connection with 
the provisions and adjudications of the mechanics lien 
statutes. King Brothers, Inc. vs. Utah Dry Kiln· Com-
pany 13 Utah 2d 339, 334 P.2d 254; Rio Gran.de Lumber 
C'o111 pany vs. Da.rke 50 Utah 114, 167 Pac. 241. Mechanics 
liens must be filed by sub-contractors within 60 days 
( \'::\8-1-7 Utah Code Am10tated 1953), and actions to 
foreclose must be commenced within one year from the 
completion of the contract ( §38-1-11 Utah Code Anno-
tatecl 1953). If the two laws are to complement each 
other, it would seem unreasonable that a sub-contractor 
or materialman should be required to foreclose his lien 
11 it bin one year, and yet have three years upon which 
to sue the owner on a personal liability. 
So far as respondents are aware, there is no class of 
creditors that is given the preferential treatment in our 
law tliat is afforded to suppliers and sub-contractors. 
They can look for payment to the parties with whom 
they contract, to the property upon which they supply 
labor or materials, and to innocent owners with whom 
tl1Pre is i10 contractual obligation. In the King Brothers, 
I 11c. r·asr;, supra, the court, without commenting thereon, 
quotPs from the memorandum decision of the trial judge, 
w!H'rein he states that the bonding law confers "an un-
ill::;tified privilege upon one class, and a penalty upon 
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another." Certainly the truth of this staiem<>nt C'<l!ii 1111 
be doubted. In the most recent bon<li1w law C'a "C· .1 1 M Cl'...._ )1 I 
Lumber Compa11y vs. Comauclie Construction Co111w11111 
18 Utah 2d 119, 417 P.2d 131, this court by way of foot-
note states as follows: 
"This statute can stand a re-evaluation, sin(·r· 
it puts the onus of obtaining the contractor\ 
bond on the unsuspecting and unknowledgealilL' 
householder who seldom knows of its existC'nre, 
- in favor of the prime supplier, who generalh 
knows all about it, hut relies on it in solw.r 
silence.'' 
It is submitted that this court should not compound tl11 
injustice by construing the statute of limitations to rwr-
mit the supplier to sit hack in "sober silence" again<t 
the unsuspecfo1g cnn1er for three yC'a rs. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUXD 
THAT PLAINTIFF \VAS NOT A l\fATERIAL-
:\iAN UNDv.JR THE BONDING STATUTE. 
Not only is there a complete lack of e\'idence i11 tJii, 
ease to show that the materials in the roofs of the horn~· 
of the various respondents herein came from Roofrr' 
Supply Company, the evidence' was m1eontradictor:. 
with the possible exception of the shingles on four jr:k 
that th0 roofing materials wen• purclrnse(l in lmlk i~ 
carloarl qnantitiC's and clelin'red to the ·warehouse 11 1 
the roofing :·rnh-contrndor. rrnkr such circumstmH'C'· 
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it is :rnbmitted that the supplier of the materials, being 
1111~nrnre of any individual construction jobs, and not 
, <'lying on any said jobs, and the sale in most instances 
prnba hly having been made before any of the contracts 
1,1·en came into existence, that the supplier is not a 
materialman as the term is contemplated in the bond-
ing- statute, but merely stands in the relationship of a 
1·crn1or wholesaler to the roofing sub-contractor. 
In the case of Crane Company vs. Utah Motor Park, 
lucorporated, 8 Utah 2d 413, 335 P2d 837. This court 
held that a supplier of a boiler to a plumbing contractor, 
11·ho in that case was a general contractor, could be held 
to he a vendor wholesaler and not a materialman under 
ihe bonding statute. In the instant case we are dealing 
11·ith a situation where the supplier is even one more 
step removed from the owner than in the Crane Compa;ny 
('ase, in that here the supplier never dealt ·with the gen-
en1 I rontractor at all. Certainly the reasoning of the 
(· mne ease should be even more applicable here. 
In a(ldition to the above, respondents contend that 
there is serious doubt in any event that the Utah bond-
ing statute extends to a materialman three steps re-
moi;ed from the owner. In 36 Am. Jur., Mecha;nics Liens, 
~re. :)2, the general rule is set out as follows: 
''Persons supplying materials to a material-
man or a sub-contractor, must come clearly within 
the terms of the Statute, or they can claim no 
lien. They are so far removed from the owner 
that the privilege of a lien is not often extended 
to tlwm and the plainest expressions of law 
must he' used to entitle them to this remedy." 
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In addition to the cases cited in 36 Am. J ur. as author. 
ity for the above rule, see also, Ge11eral Capital Cor11ri-
ration vs. Adobe Brick and Supply Company, Florida, 
138 So. 2d 82; Cheesbro-Whitman Company vs. E'r:h 11 
boro Apart1nents, Inc. N.J., 207 A.2d 186; Hribar Truck 
ing Inc. vs. State of TVisconsin, Wisconsin, 126 N.W. 2rl 
52. An example of what is meant hy the "plainest C'X-
pressions of law," is the Florida Statute found at 61-32G 
Florida La,vs, ·which prO\'ides as follows: 
"It is the legislative intent that materialmen 
furnishing materials to a subcontractor ... 
shall be entitled to the benefits of this chapter.'' 
The above may be compared to the Utah Statute which 
merely gives a cause of action to ''all persons who han 
furnished materials or performed labor under the con-
tract." It is contended that the phrase "under the e011-
tract'' refers to the contract between the owner and tl11· 
general contractor and that the only persons afforded 
relief, in absence of clear language to the contrary, are 
suppliers and subcontractors dealing with parties to 
that contract. 
The evidence in this case showed that plaintiff \rH~ 
not a manufacturer of roofing materials, but mcn•l: 
a distributor. If the reasoning of Roofer Supply Com-
pany is carried to its logical conclusion, what is to pre-
vent the manufacturer from suing the home O\Yncr if 
the manufacturPr is not paid, or what is to prevent the 
suppliers of the component parts to the mmrnfactnrrr' 
from suing the home owner if in turn they arc not paid. 
There must he some point at which the liahilit~' is c11t 
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off, and that point should end with materialmen and 
s11heo11tractors to the gen.?ral contractor. Particularly 
~lionld tlus be the case where the Statute involved is by 
natme oppressive and unjust and is normally invoked 
against one who reasonably cannot be expected to even 
kuow of its existence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the authorities cited herein and the 
strong policy arguments in favor of the respondents 
herein, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of 
tlw trial court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS, ARMSTRONG, 
RAWLINGS & WEST 
David E. West 
Attorneys for Defendamts 
and Respondents 
1300 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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